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A FURTHER COMMENT ON STARE DECISIS 
AND THE OVERRULING OF NATIONAL 
LEAGUE OF CITIES 
Philip P. Frickey* 
Phases and stages, circles and cycles, 
scenes that we've all seen before, 
let me tell you some more . . . . 
Willie Nelson 
Willie Nelson's refrain was written with the human cycle of 
courtship and separation in mind, but it applies equally well to the 
Supreme Court's stormy romance with state sovereignty. As I 
noted in the last issue of this journal,' in 1968 the Supreme Court 
upheld federal regulation of the wages of state employees, rejecting 
the argument that the Constitution provides states with immunity 
from federal regulation adopted pursuant to Congress's power to 
regulate commerce.2 Eight years later, in National League of Cities 
v. Usery, a Supreme Court with four new members overruled the 
1968 decision by a five-to-four vote and held that states are constitu-
tionally immune from federal regulation that "directly displace[s] 
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions. "3 Another eight years later, the 
Court set Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority for 
reargument and sua sponte requested the parties to discuss whether 
National League of Cities should be reconsidered.4 
It was the burden of my last essay to demonstrate that princi-
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not cease to be regulations of commerce because a State is involved. If a State is 
engaging in economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal Govern-
ment when engaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform 
its activities to federal regulation. 
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pies of stare decisis, when properly understood, did not counsel 
against overruling National League of Cities. In its decision in Gar-
cia,s the Court apparently agreed. In an opinion by Justice Black-
mun, it expressly overruled that precedent. The majority in Garcia 
consisted of the four dissenters in National League of Cities and Jus-
tice Blackmun, who had only haltingly joined that precedent and 
had since appeared largely to recant that position. My earlier essay 
attempted to justify such a change of heart by Justice Blackmun,6 
and I do not believe any further extended discussion of his role with 
respect to stare decisis is necessary. The discussions of stare decisis 
given in the majority and dissenting opinions in Garcia are worth 
noting, however, as are the differing measures of protection of state 
sovereignty that divided the Justices. It is to these subjects that 
these comments are addressed. 
I 
My earlier essay suggested that opinions overruling precedents 
have often stressed certain factors to indicate that the overruling of 
precedent is based on principle, not judicial politics. These factors 
include whether the overruled decision was wrong from the start, 
whether its basis has eroded over time, whether the Court has had 
difficulty in applying the decision, and whether later decisions are in 
tension with it. National League of Cities seemed particularly vul-
nerable in light of these factors, since in my view "[it] was both 
wrong and precedentially weak from the start, has been stretched to 
the breaking point in later decisions, and can be overruled without 
creating undue hardship on innocent parties."7 Justice Blackmun's 
majority opinion in Garcia stressed all but the last of these factors. 
First, the opinion stated that National League of Cities was 
wrongly decided. The basic flaw in that precedent, the Court con-
cluded, was that it gave the Court the primary responsibility for 
protecting state sovereignty. Instead, "[a]part from the limitation 
on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' 
Article I powers, the principal means chosen by the Framers to en-
sure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure 
of the Federal Government itself."s Thus, the Court adopted the 
argument of various commentators that state sovereignty is "more 
properly protected" by the federal political process-in which the 
states are represented by their Senators and Representatives, con-
5. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). 
6. See Frickey, supra note I, at 142-44. 
7. /d. at 129. 
8. 105 S.Ct. at 1018. 
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trol the qualifications of voters in federal elections, and participate 
in the electoral college-"than by judicially created limitations on 
federal power."9 
The Court did not, however, absolutely foreclose judicial re-
view of federal legislation intruding upon state sovereignty. As the 
above quotations suggest, in a rare case such legislation may be be-
yond Congress's delegated powers under article I. Moreover, the 
Court acknowledged the possibility that federal legislation intrud-
ing upon state sovereignty could result from a manifest malfunction 
of the procedural protections available to the states. It stressed that 
"[a]ny substantive restraint on the exercise of the Commerce Clause 
powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this 
basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible 
failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a 'sa-
cred province of state autonomy.' "10 The Court concluded that 
"[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safeguards of the 
political process have performed as intended.'' Thus, the Court was 
not required "to identify or define what affirmative limits the consti-
tutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the 
States under the Commerce Clause." 11 
Second, the Garcia Court noted that National League of Cities 
was decided "by a sharply divided vote,"I2 and that "the separate 
concurrence providing the fifth vote in National League of Cities 
was 'not untroubled by certain possible implications' of the deci-
sion.''13 The Court in Garcia did not make much of the preceden-
tial weakness of National League of Cities itself, presumably because 
Justice Blackmun, the author of Garcia, was that "not untroubled" 
critical fifth vote in National League of Cities. A more forthcoming 
mea culpa might seem appropriate to some observers, but a major-
ity opinion does not seem to be an appropriate forum for a personal 
apology. Had another Justice written Garcia, a separate opinion by 
Justice Blackmun explaining his change of view might well have 
been in order. 
Third, the Garcia Court stressed the problems it and the lower 
courts had encountered in attempting to apply National League of 
9. ld. at n.Jl. The Court cited approvingly J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-184 ( 1980); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Feder-
alism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 
CoLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); and La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux.· 
Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 779 
(1982). 
10. ld. at 1019-20. 
II. ld. at 1020. 
12. Id. at 1007. 
13. /d. at 1021. 
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Cities. It found the lower courts in hopeless, yet understandable 
disarray in their attempts to define "traditional governmental func-
tions" immune from federal regulation under that precedent.I4 
Moreover, it concluded that "this Court itself has made little head-
way in defining the scope of the governmental functions deemed 
protected under National League of Cities. "Is As a result, National 
League of Cities was "unsound in principle," as well as "unwork-
able in practice," because it "inevitably invites an unelected federal 
judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and 
which ones it dislikes."I6 
The Court in Garcia did not address one issue relating to stare 
decisis: whether overruling National League of Cities retroactively 
would cause undue hardship upon state or local governments that 
had reasonably relied upon that precedent. The retroactivity issue 
will presumably come before the district court on remand in Garcia. 
The Court's refusal to address the issue of retroactivity is by no 
means unique, and, as I suggested in the earlier essay, may have 
been the best approach to take in Garcia.l7 
Although the majority opinion in Garcia did discuss the rele-
vant factors concerning whether to overrule National League of Cit-
ies, it did not systematically address considerations of stare decisis. 
Indeed, read in isolation, the Court's only overt reference to stare 
decisis, which appears at the end of the opinion, might seem disap-
pointingly brief and superficial: 
We do not lightly overrule recent precedent. We have not hesitated, however, 
when it has become apparent that a prior decision has departed from a proper un-
derstanding of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. See United States 
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-117 (1941). Due respect for the reach of congressional 
power within the federal system mandates that we do so now. IS 
Yet it would exalt form over substance to make much of a failure to 
address stare decisis directly, when the opinion contains all that 
need be said to justify overruling precedent. A concluding section 
to Garcia addressing stare decisis would have been a nice touch, 19 
but in the context of this opinion the omission of such a discussion 
14. /d. at 1011. 
15. /d. 
16. /d. at 1015-16. 
17. See Frickey, supra note I, at 138-40. 
18. 105 S. Ct. at 1021. At the end of the first sentence of this quotation, the Court 
dropped a footnote with a "but see" cite to United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 83, 86-87 
(1978), which overruled United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), and used language 
that would justify the overruling of National League of Cities in Garcia. See Frickey, supra 
note I, at 141-42. 
19. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 695-701 (1978); 
Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403-05 (1970). 
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does not demonstrate disrespect for the principles underlying that 
doctrine. 
II 
Stare decisis often seems to be the dissenter's last desperate ral-
lying cry. So it was in Garcia, in which the major dissenting opin-
ion, written by Justice Powell and joined by the Chief Justice and 
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, argued that "[t]here have been 
few cases . . . in which the principle of stare decisis and the ration-
ale of recent decisions were ignored as abruptly as we now wit-
ness."2o Justice Powell's assertion is long on hyperbole and short 
on hypothesis. I see no need to explain further why, in contrast to 
Justice Powell, I believe overruling National League of Cities was a 
principled result. What I do wish to challenge briefly is Powell's 
implicit contention that the Supreme Court rarely overrules recent 
precedent. The statistics are squarely to the contrary.21 Moreover, 
contrary to Justice Powell's suggestion,22 the fact that the Court's 
decisions attempting to apply National League of Cities consistently 
"reiterated" the reasoning of that decision in no way immunized it 
from overruling. A common pattern in the overruling of precedent 
involves initial attempts to apply the decision properly, followed by 
a frank recognition that the precedent is unworkable or inconsistent 
with the decisions that have followed it. Indeed, the dissenters in 
Garcia have used precisely this analysis in overruling important 
precedents concerning the constitutional rights of criminal defend-
ants.23 Thus, Justice Powell's comment that "[t]he stability of judi-
cial decision, and with it respect for the authority of this Court, are 
not served by the precipitous overruling of multiple precedents that 
we witness in this case"24 is misleading at best. Moreover, it is diffi-
cult to conceive of this overruling as "precipitous," since several 
decisions since National League of Cities have been in tension with 
the basic rationale of that precedent.2s When Justice Powell's reli-
ance on stare decisis is analyzed in this light, it becomes apparent 
that Garcia was less an affront to stare decisis than was the overrul-
ing of Maryland v. Wirtz in National League of Cities-an overrul-
20. 105 S.Ct. at 1021 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
21. See Frickey, supra note I, at 140 n.63. 
22. 105 S. Ct. at 1021. 
23. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) (overruling Spinelli v. United States, 
393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)); United States v. Salvucci, 
448 U.S. 83 (1980) (overruling Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)); United States v. 
Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (overruling United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975)). 
24. 105 S. Ct. at 1022 (emphasis added). 
25. See. e.g., Frickey, supra note I, at 132-37. 
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ing that, unlike Garcia, was caused by major changes in the 
composition of the Court and was not nearly so predictable based 
on prior decisions.26 
Justice Powell read National League of Cities as adopting a bal-
ancing approach-which came as some surprise to its author, Jus-
tice Rehnquist27-that supposedly protected state sovereignty far 
better than does the federal political process relied upon by the ma-
jority. At least three elements of his discussion concerning this bal-
ancing test deserve comment. 
First, Powell charged that the majority in Garcia rejected "al-
most 200 years of the understanding of the constitutional status of 
federalism."2s His assessment of the history of federalism is in part 
a return to an earlier debate between Justice Stevens and himself.29 
One can easily agree with Powell's premise that the framers consid-
ered federalism a fundamental value and yet disagree with his con-
clusions. As the Court in Garcia said, "to say that the Constitution 
assumes the continued role of the States is to say little about the 
nature of that role."Jo There is simply no textual basis for immu-
nizing the states from federal regulation adopted pursuant to the 
commerce clause. Indeed, as the majority concluded, the only pro-
tections for state interests clearly provided by the language and the 
structure of the Constitution are procedural in nature. Moreover, 
Powell's assertion that the majority opinion was inconsistent with 
200 years of history ignores not only Maryland v. Wirtz, but also 
other precedent dating back at least to 1936.31 
Second, Powell's discussion of the nature and importance of 
the procedural protections available to the states is astounding. He 
asserted that "[t]his Court has never before abdicated responsibility 
for assessing the constitutionality of challenged action on the 
ground that affected parties theoretically are able to look out for 
their own interests through the electoral process."J2 This conclu-
sion is simply false. Much of modern equal protection jurispru-
dence since that famous footnote in Carolene Products depends 
upon a model of judicial restraint based upon the presumptive fair-
26. See id. at 125-26, 129, 140-44. 
27. See 105 S. Ct. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting): "Justice Powell's reference to the 
'balancing test' approved in National League of Cities is not identical with the language in 
that case .... " 
28. 105 S. Ct. at 1023 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
29. Compare id. at 1027-32 with Justice Stevens's concurring opinion and Justice Pow-
ell's dissenting opinion in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). 
30. 105 S.Ct. at 1017. 
31. See Frickey, supra note 1, at 124-25. 
32. 105 S. Ct. at 1026 n.l2. In addition, see id. at 1035 (O'Connor, J., joined by Powell 
and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). 
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ness of the political process.JJ For example, in holding that a 
facially neutral statute that has a racially or sexually disproportion-
ate impact violates equal protection only when plaintiffs can bear 
the difficult burden of proving that the legislation was the result of 
discriminatory motivations, the Court has stated: 
The calculus of effects, the manner in which a particular law reverberates in a soci-
ety, is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility .... When some other in-
dependent right is not at stake, . . . and when there is no "reason to infer 
antipathy," ... it is presumed that "even improvident decisions will eventually be 
rectified by the democratic process ... :•34 
Indeed, the approach of the majority in Garcia mirrors equal pro-
tection jurisprudence, allowing the states to prove that the political 
process malfunctioned in producing federal legislation that intrudes 
upon core state functions. 
Powell's lamentations about the supposed insensitivity of the 
federal political process to the interests of the statesJs seem oddly 
out of place not only when compared to the Court's presumption 
that the political process adequately protects minorities from dis-
criminatory legislation, but also when contrasted with the Court's 
refusal to consider imbalances in the political system caused by the 
unequal distribution of resources available for political lobbying and 
expenditures.36 Powell himself wrote Arlington Heights v. Metropol-
itan Housing Development Corp., which presumed that the political 
process generally protects minorities, and First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, which refused to consider the distorting effects of 
money in the political process. In contrast, he has this to say about 
heightened scrutiny of federal regulation of the states: 
[W]e have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous special interest groups that 
engage in sophisticated lobbying, and make substantial campaign contributions to 
some members of the Congress. These groups are thought to have significant influ-
ence in the shaping and enactment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the 
Court's view, a "political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard 
the sovereign rights of States and localities.37 
33. My colleague Suzanna Sherry called my attention to Justice Powell's own assess-
ment of the Caro/ene Products theory. See Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 1087 (1982). 
34. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 
440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)). See also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 133-34 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
35. See 105 S.Ct. at 1025 n. 9: "The adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment (provid-
ing for direct election of senators), the weakening of political parties on the local level, and 
the rise of national media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less repre-
sentative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to the demands of 
various national constituencies." 
36. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); First Nat') 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976). 
37. 105 S.Ct. at 1031 n.l8. 
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It is no answer to say that the structure of the Constitution presup-
poses a vital role for the states, since the equal protection clause 
surely presupposes a meaningful role in America for minorities and 
counsels against ignoring inequality of political power caused by 
wealth. In short, what's sauce for the goose ought to be sauce for 
the gander, or, to use another fowl metaphor, perhaps what most 
irked Powell is that the chickens have come home to roost.Js 
Third, Powell's application of the balancing approach to the 
facts of Garcia demonstrates the soundness of the majority's denial 
of any "license to employ freestanding conceptions of state sover-
eignty when measuring congressional authority under the Com-
merce Clause."39 For Powell, the municipal operation of mass 
transit at issue in Garcia, though "relatively new in the life of our 
country," should be immune from federal regulation for the follow-
ing reasons: 
[It] is a classic example of the type of service traditionally provided by local govern-
ment. It is local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from the tradi-
tional services of providing and maintaining streets, public lighting, traffic control, 
water, and sewerage systems. Services of this kind are precisely those "with which 
citizens are more 'familiarly and minutely conversant.' " The Federalist, No. 46, p. 
316. State and local officials of course must be intimately familiar with those serv-
ices and sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also know that their 
constituents and the press respond to the adequacy, fair distribution, and cost of 
these services. It is this kind of state and local control and accountability that the 
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal system 
that the Constitution explicitly requires. 40 
This approach reveals no standard that can be applied in a princi-
pled fashion and depends largely, if not solely, upon the judge's own 
policy preferences. Powell as much as admitted the latter point 
when he chided the majority for looking "myopically only to per-
sons elected to positions in the federal government" and disregard-
ing "entirely the far more effective role of democratic self-
38. Had Powell's refusal to trust the political process prevailed in Garcia, some com-
mentators would have pounced on the inconsistency between his approach and the Court's 
decisions involving discrimination and involving money in politics. The more optimistic 
might have suggested that Powell's analysis was the harbinger of a new jurisprudence--one 
that must strike down legislation with demonstrable discriminatory effects regardless of 
whether the legislation was impermissibly motivated and that must uphold limitations on 
political expenditures. Those predictions would have been about as accurate, of course, as 
the suggestion that National League of Cities established a constitutional right to welfare. See 
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 313 (1978); Michelman, States' Rights and 
States' Roles: The Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 
YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unravelling National League of Cities: The New Federalism 
and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Senices, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1977). 
39. lOS S.Ct. at 1017. 
40. /d. at 1032. 
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government at the state and /ocallevels."41 The framers--or at least 
the antifederalists-may well have shared this Jeffersonian vision, 
but modern developments, not the least of which being the inte-
grated national economy, have rendered it romantic and outdated. 
More important, the framers inserted no language in the Constitu-
tion attempting to compel later generations to live according to that 
vision of democratic federalism, and modern circumstances have 
forced Congress to deal with many matters that may seem "local" 
in and of themselves. Since there is no single, identifiable vision of 
federalism imbedded in the Constitution from which judges can dis-
cern and apply neutral principles of state immunity, the majority in 
41. /d. at 1031 (emphasis added). Justice Powell continued: 
One must compare realistically the operation of the state and local governments 
with that of the federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily by the 
staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the hundreds of bills introduced 
at each session of Congress and the complexity of many of them, it is virtually 
impossible for even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar with many 
of the statutes enacted. Federal departments and agencies customarily are author-
ized to write regulations. Often these are more important than the text of the stat-
utes. As is true of the original legislation, these are drafted largely by staff 
personnel. The administration and enforcement offederallaws and regulations nec-
essarily are largely in the hands of staff and civil service employees. These employ-
ees may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities that will be affected 
by the statutes and regulations for which they are responsible. In any case, they 
hardly are as accessible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions in 
State and local governments. 
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these federal employees or the 
officials who are ultimately in charge. The great majority are conscientious and 
faithful to their duties. My point is simply that members of the immense federal 
bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the services traditionally rendered by 
States and localities, and are inevitably less responsive to recipients of such services, 
than are state legislatures, city councils, boards of supervisors, and state and local 
commissions, boards, and agencies. It is at these state and local levels-not in 
Washington as the Court so mistakenly thinks-that "democratic self-government" 
is best exemplified. 
/d. at 1031-32. The many empirical assumptions in this excerpt are troubling. Indeed, the 
overall tenor of Powell's dissent is inconsistent with the vision of a federal government 
designed to protect minorities against local prejudices-a vision at least as old as the Consti-
tution itself. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison). Cf Powell's comment quoted 
in the text at note 37. One rather obvious example demonstrating the inconsistency between 
Powell's vision of federalism and the facts involves minority vote dilution. Empirical studies 
have demonstrated that minority citizens have been fenced out of the political process in 
communities where racial bloc voting occurs and certain "reform" political structures, such 
as multi-member districts in which officials are elected at large, are present. See, e.g., Mobile 
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 105 n.3 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing studies); Davidson & 
Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation: A Reexamination of Histori-
cal and Contemporary Evidence, 43 J. PoL. 982 (1981). Finding no relief in these localities, 
minorities were forced to seek legislation from the Congress, which eventually amended the 
Voting Rights Act to outlaw certain types of electoral structures that result in dilution of the 
minority vote. See The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, § 3, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 
Stat. 131, 134, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1973, discussed in Frickey, Majority Rule, Minority 
Rights, and the Right to Vote: Reflections Upon a Reading a/Minority Vote Dilution, 3 J. L. 
& INEQUALITY_ (1985) (forthcoming). My simple point is that local democracy is not 
always what it is cracked up to be. 
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Garcia quite rightly concluded that the states, like the rest of us, are 
subject to the national political process. 
III 
The dissents of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor in Garcia did 
not directly attack the majority opinion as an affront to stare deci-
sis. What these Justices did say, however, was more ominous. Both 
asserted that the approach of the majority is likely to be short-lived, 
and that National League of Cities will be resurrected. 42 This view 
may be nothing more than sour grapes, or wishful thinking, or un-
objectionable prognosticating. But considering that three of the five 
Justices in the majority are over seventy-five years of age, the com-
ments of Rehnquist and O'Connor have the effect, if not the intent, 
of shrouding Garcia with a pall that is funereal in both senses of 
that word. 
The Court should be exceedingly reluctant to overturn Garcia. 
The most obvious reason is that any overruling of precedent exposes 
the Court's subjective side, and further flip-flopping on state sover-
eignty will appear ridiculous. The dissenters in Garcia can com-
plain that the decision is wrong and pernicious, and of course there 
is no neutral way to rebut these assertions conclusively. But the 
overruling of National League of Cities in Garcia was based on the 
standard stuff of overruling: a decision that was weak preceden-
tially from the start had proved unworkable in practice and, at least 
to one key Justice, weak in principle. In contrast, application of 
Garcia in future cases should be straightforward. 
Moreover, Garcia is unlikely to be overruled unless there is a 
change in the Court's membership. New Justices ought to think 
long and hard before voting to overrule a decision handed down 
before their time, if durability of law and stare decisis are to mean 
anything.43 In contrast, a Justice who, like Blackmun, only halt-
ingly provided the fifth vote to a precedent and has participated in 
subsequent decisions in tension with it is in a much more principled 
position to vote to overrule it.44 
It is interesting to speculate what might occur if Robert Bork, 
42. 105 S. Ct. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting): "I do not think it incumbent on those 
of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in 
time again command the support of a majority of this Court"; id at 1038 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting): "I share Justice Rehnquist's belief that this Court will in time again assume its 
constitutional responsibility." 
43. See, e.g .• Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Florida Nursing Home 
Assoc., 450 U.S. 147, 151-55 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
160, 189-92 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
44. See Frickey, supra note I, at 142-44. 
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who is apparently the current odds-on favorite, is appointed to fill 
the next vacancy on the Court. As Solicitor General, Bork argued 
National League of Cities on behalf of the federal government. Ad-
vocacy being what it is, perhaps he did not personally believe the 
argument that he made, but my reading of the transcript suggests 
that he forcefully advocated the federal position.4s In addition, 
Bork is a strident opponent of judicial balancing tests,46 and that is 
what the cases following National League of Cities utilized,47 as Jus-
tice Powell's dissent in Garcia recognized. The only other way to 
define "state sovereignty," at least if modern economic realities are 
considered, would seem to be a static historical test measuring what 
the states have traditionally done. That approach would draw a 
nonsensical distinction between traditional activities, which would 
be protected even if trivial, and modern innovations, which would 
not be protected regardless of their merit. For all these reasons, it 
seems questionable whether Bork--or, for that matter, any other 
principled new Justice-would vote to overrule Garcia. 
Furthermore, Bork himself has already answered the funda-
mental complaint of the dissenting Justices in Garcia. Justice 
O'Connor summed up their position when she stated that, "[w]ith 
the abandonment of National League of Cities, all that stands be-
tween the remaining essentials of state sovereignty and Congress is 
the latter's underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint."4s Compare 
a passage from Bork's famous article on constitutional law: 
In Lochner, Justice Peckham, defending liberty from what he conceived as a mere 
meddlesome interference, asked, "[A]re we all . . . at the mercy of legislative ma-
jorities?" The correct answer, where the Constitution does not speak, must be 
"yes."49 
IV 
In the final analysis, stare decisis is probably often only a mi-
nor factor in each Justice's voting calculus. But any reconsideration 
of Garcia ought not forget a valuable lesson, as old as Marbury it-
self-that there are instances in which the Court can greatly en-
hance its overall authority and image by rejecting the power to 
engage in a less important function. A renewed attempt to identify 
a sanctum of state sovereignty not only would waste the Court's 
45. See id. at 145 (quoting a colloquy between Bork and Justice Rehnquist). 
46. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1392-97 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.), reh'g 
en bane denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (1984); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I (1971). 
47. See Frickey, supra note I, at 132-37. 
48. 105 S.Ct. at 1037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
49. Bork, supra note 46, at II (footnote omitted). 
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scarce judicial resources, but would expose the Court to ridicule as 
a wholly unprincipled institution driven largely by the personal 
whims of its members. It is time to close the door upon state sover-
eignty and move on to other issues. 
